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1 Introduction
An organization’s form determines its economic success. Although organizational
form appears fixed for many organizations, it can also change. In 2006, the New
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and Mastercard, two major financial institutions,
converted from cooperatives to investor-owned firms.1 Visa, another major credit
card operator, swiftly followed suit, completing its demutualization process with
an IPO in 2008. These specific events continue the trend of organizational change
in the financial sector (see the survey by Chaddad and Cook, 2004), retailing, and
professional services.2 On the other hand, the percentage of for-profit nursing
homes in the United States has decreased by 23 percent between 1985 and 1995,
while nonprofit-operated increased by 13.2 percent (see Chou, 2002). As there
is no uniquely optimal organizational form, it is important to examine the pros
and cons of each, especially in the light of the current trend to privatize formerly
“essential”services (such as hospitals, prisons, or educational institutions) in many
OECD countries.
What determines optimal organizational structure? We make three contri-
butions towards an answer: First, we formalize the difference between profit-
maximizing firms, nonprofits, and cooperatives and compare the efficiency of each
in order to endogenize organizational choice. Second, we explain how nonprof-
its and cooperatives might exist – even with rational, self-interested consumers
and without asymmetric information about product quality. Third, we examine
the impact of outside competition on organizational change – one of the most-
frequently cited reasons for shifts in organizational structures. We compare effi-
ciency among (i) purely profit maximizing firms ; (ii) nonprofits pursuing a purely
non-monetary objective; (iii) cooperatives whose members enjoy both monetary
payoffs and a non-monetary benefit. We consider the case where each organiza-
tion employs a manager, who can exert effort to produce a good with the quality
level set by the organization’s owners but has discretion with respect to pricing.
The decision making process is costly whenever owners’ goals are not perfectly
homogenous. We also consider the interaction between the set of owner-members
and organizational outcomes.
We derive the following main results. In equilibrium, there is a clear ranking
of qualities provided: firms provide lowest levels and nonprofits highest levels of
quality. Efficiency, however, depends on the cost of production and the cost of
collective decision making. For high cost of collective decision making, a firm
usually is the most efficient form. Yet, for lower levels of these costs, firms are
1The NYSE converted its organization via the acquisition of Archipelago in March 2006,
while Mastercard made its IPO in May 2006.
2In the UK, for example, the “Clementi Report” initiated a (still ongoing) discussion about
the pros and cons of investor ownership of law firms. See www.legal-services-review.org.uk/
and the reporting in The Economist, December 16th 2004, or in the business press (e.g. the
Financial Times, December 16th and 20th 2004).
1
increasingly dominated by either nonprofits or cooperatives (depending on the
incremental cost of quality production). Using comparative statics, we show that
increased competition improves the efficiency of firms vis-a`-vis nonprofits and
cooperatives, thus providing a potential reason for organizational change.
Recent analyses of financial exchange demutualization generally support the
trade-offs developed in the paper (see Aggarwal, 2002; Steil, 2002; Aggarwal and
Dahiya, 2006). These studies report that almost every financial exchange was or-
ganized as a mutual organization during some period of its existence. Its owners
were financial intermediaries (broker-dealers) who consumed the good provided
by the exchange (the trading platform) and used it to sell their services to other
investors. Initially, all owners shared their interests in the exchange’s quality of
transaction services (liquidity, trade-related services and regulations). However,
increased competition – due to financial and technological developments as well
as financial de-regulation – affected members of exchanges in various ways: As
a direct effect, new trading technologies offered some brokers alternative means
to trade. Additionally, it forced exchanges to consider introducing new trading
systems, often at the expense of traditional floor-trading. This lead to more
heterogenous interests among the original members, with disagreement about
business development particularly between large international banks and local
specialists (Steil, 2002). Demutualization of exchanges was thus seen as an op-
timal organizational response to tougher competition and more costly internal
decision-making processes.
We follow the literature on organizational choice that emphasizes the influence
of organizational form on objectives.3 Glaeser and Shleifer (2001) analyze non-
profits and firms when noncontractible quality matters. The entrepreneur who
chooses the nonprofit form produces high quality because he can consume divi-
dends only as perks. Vlassopoulos (2009) extends Glaeser and Shleifer (2001) and
finds that, when reputations can be sustained, the for-profit organizational form
is always preferable in that setup. Therefore, Vlassopoulos concludes that the
focus on contractual imperfections in the producer/consumer relationship alone
cannot explain the variety of organizational forms observed empirically. This
finding is reflected in our model by the assumption that the owners of an orga-
nization, who may also consume the product, can contract with the manager on
the quality produced.
Malani, Philipson, and David (2003) compare the noncontractible quality
model with alternative nonprofit models of altruism and worker cooperatives.
They report that empirical studies comparing nonprofits and firms provide no
clear ranking of the theoretical models with respect to their predictive power.
Hart and Moore (1996) compare firms and cooperatives when monopoly pricing
3Note that this approach differs from the literature on organizational design that analyzes
optimal internal structures for a given organizational form. See, for example, Athey and Roberts
(2001) or Hart and Moore (2005).
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or skewness in members’ preferences distort prices such that the first-best cannot
be reached. They also find that firms are more competitive than cooperatives. In
an analysis of partnerships, which are reminiscent of the cooperatives we model,
Levin and Tadelis (2005) focus on the choice of partner quality. The authors
show that partnerships are preferable in settings of high market power. Pru¨fer
(2011) models duopoly competition between nonprofits in a model related to the
one at hand. He shows that the owners’ objective function has a strong impact
on the welfare implications for mergers among nonprofits. Finally, Hart, Shleifer,
and Vishny (1997) compare public and private firms in the provision of quality
and cost efficiency.
In all these contributions, the different objectives implied by an organizational
form affect the economic outcomes and highlight the trade-offs in organizational
choice. However, none of them attempts to compare the performance of three
organizational forms in a uniform framework that establishes a level playing field
across forms. In our model, each type of organization is characterized by separa-
tion of ownership and control where the employed manager has some discretion in
decision making and heterogenous owners have potentially conflicting interests.
In section 2, we describe the three organizational forms in more detail and
relate the definitions further to the literature. Section 3 outlines the model. In
section 4, we compare equilibria and efficiency of the three organizational forms.
Section 5 contains the effect of competition on organizational efficiency and thus
choice. In section 6, we discuss robustness and extensions before concluding in
section 7. All proofs are relegated to the appendix.
2 Organizational Forms
Within the property rights based theory of the firm, an organization is charac-
terized by ownership over assets. Following this literature, we define ownership
by residual rights of control here.4 Consequently, one of the crucial traits of any
organization is the identity of its owners. The type of owners, combined with
other restrictions and determinants of their action space, determines the nature
of the organization’s overall objective function. Hereafter, we characterize each
organizational form in three dimensions: (i) Who holds the residual rights of
control? (ii) Who owns the claims to any residual income? (iii) What is the
objective function of the owners? Further questions to be asked for any organi-
zational form are: Where does the organization obtain financing from? And how
do (multiple) owners achieve a decision about the issues at hand (and at what
cost)? We will discuss these issues in the following paragraphs. Table 1 in the
appendix summarizes the major characteristics for all three organizational forms.
One important characteristic of every organization is the identity of its dom-
inating group of stakeholders (Hansmann, 1996): workers, suppliers, consumers,
4See Grossman and Hart (1986) or Hart and Moore (1990).
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or investors. For expositional clarity and to be able to compare the performance
of all three organizational forms on a level playing field, in our model we focus on
the case where the organization is dominated by consumers. This is commensu-
rate with assuming that each player has a positive—yet heterogenous—marginal
valuation of product quality.
In the case of for-profit firms, the valuation of owners (investors) is suffi-
ciently low such that they do not buy the product themselves, in equilibrium,
and foresee this outcome. Consequently, we define an organization where owners
de facto maximize solely their financial return on investment as a firm.5 These in-
vestors can be thought of as individuals using the organization’s dividends to pur-
chase other, unmodeled goods. Hence, in contrast to cooperatives and nonprofits,
investor-owners de facto do not benefit from consuming the product produced by
their firm. They hold both residual rights of income and control. Absent any
other imperfections and due to the absence of a consumption goal, all sharehold-
ers of a firm pursue the same objective, that is maximizing firm profits. Our basic
analysis will hence show that investors’ interests are completely aligned, and thus
any investor could decide on behalf of the other investors. All operational costs
in a firm have to be covered by its (expected) retained earnings.
On the other side of the spectrum, an organization is defined as a nonprofit
if its owners – henceforth called members – have a purely non-financial inter-
est in the activity of the organization. By definition, members of a nonprofit, in
contrast both to firms and cooperatives, forego all rights of residual income. Gen-
erally, these rights could rest with the members as non-monetary perquisites (see
e.g. Glaeser and Shleifer, 2001), be transferred to a manager or other employees
(in cash or in perquisites), or be transferred to some other charitable use. This
ex ante waiver of residual income is captured by the term non-distribution con-
straint.6 Despite the absence of residual income rights, members may use their
control rights to dismiss managers not complying with their duty. This manage-
rial compliance could be assured either by delegation via a board of trustees or
directly via the members’ general meeting.7
The valuation of quality by nonprofit members can stem from their consump-
5Unlike Glaeser and Shleifer (2001), we exclude single-owner and owner-managed firms but
focus on multiple ownership as this allows us to capture issues of collective decision making as
a specific and important aspect of many ownership structures.
6We note that other authors allow nonprofits to distribute their profits to owners, be it
directly (Lakdawalla and Philipson, 2006) or indirectly via price subsidies (Kuan, 2001). While
relaxing the non-distribution constraint takes into account aspects of some real nonprofit orga-
nizations, we stick to the original constraint in order to highlight the generic characteristics of
nonprofits.
7In any type of organization with dispersed multiple owners, a manager has some leeway.
However, once the cost of (mis-)behavior are sufficiently high or issues at stake are sufficiently
important, owners/members can be expected to interfere and to be actively involved in the
decision making process. See O’Regan and Oster (2005) for empirical evidence on the behaviour
of nonprofits’ board members and executive directors.
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tion preferences, for instance, in the case of a church or a community center that
is organized by and produces services for its members, or when the nonprofit is a
trade association that produces services that are both determined and consumed
by its member-firms.8 Alternatively, a nonprofit’s owners could be workers of a
charity or be working in a “care” industry, such as health care, child care, or care
for the elderly (Francois, 2007). Such workers are often intrinsically motivated to
produce goods or services with public goods characteristics and therefore value a
high quality of production.9
Both of these interpretations can be captured by a model in which nonprofit
owners have a valuation for quality. Although the natural focus of members of a
nonprofit in a model of quality production is on quality (given that an alternative
use of funds is ruled out by the non-distribution constraint), we show that there
can still be disagreement among members about the preferred quality level.10 As
a consequence, it is the median member who effectively determines the quality
level contained in the manager’s employment contract. Finally, nonprofits may
(and often do) receive financing from donations or membership fees, in addition
to financing out of retained earnings.11
Cooperatives resemble firms regarding the ability to pay out dividends, but
they also have elements of a nonprofit. We define an organization as a cooperative
if its owners have a direct interest in the cooperative’s activity (as consumers, in
this paper) but also care about dividends. Hence, members of a cooperative hold
both residual rights of income and control. Our results will show that this leads
to disagreement among members. Similarly to the nonprofit case, the median
member’s preferences will be implemented. In general, members of a cooperative
have both their expected consumer surplus and the organization’s revenues to
finance operations.
In the terminology of Hansmann (1996), our model analyzes the ability of the
three organizational forms to overcome the costs of market contracting which arise
from market power in setting price and quality. By assuming certain key features
8In this case, “non-financial interests” refer to the fact that association members have no
direct pecuniary benefits from membership, in the form of dividends or increased share prices.
Our definition does not preclude an indirect pecuniary interest, which is satisfied through the
consumption of the nonprofit association’s services, for instance lobbying. See Pru¨fer (2015) or
Larrain and Pru¨fer (2015) for details.
9See Besley and Ghatak (2005), Francois (2003, 2007), and Delfgaauw and Dur (2007, 2008)
for models, empirical analysis, and further examples.
10Notably, in a model with different focus, nonprofit owners may maximize another non-
financial objective. For instance, Filistrucchi and Pru¨fer (2013) show that decision makers in
church-affiliated German nonprofit hospitals make strategic decisions that can be traced back
to the teachings of their respective religions.
11In the model, we assume donors and members to be identical. We use the term members in
order to highlight their possession of residual rights of control. Our specification of nonprofits
and its owners is equivalent to the nonprofit cooperative of Hart and Moore (1998) and is related
to the commercial nonprofit of Hansmann (1996).
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distinguishing the organizations, we model the trade-off between several costs of
ownership. On the one hand, all organizations face the same cost structure for
the production of quality (mainly in the form of managerial effort costs). On the
other hand, there are costs of ownership which differ between the organizational
forms. In investor-owned firms and to a lesser extent in cooperatives, consumer
surplus has less weight (relative to profits) in the decision making process of
the owners than is socially desirable. In combination with market power, this
leads to underprovision of quality. The reverse is true for nonprofits: due to the
nondistribution constraint, consumer surplus is key in owners’ decision making
while profitability aspects are neglected. Hence, costly overprovision of quality
results. Finally, if individual members’ preferences for quality differ and goal
alignment of the membership base is not achieved, an organization incurs extra
costs of collective decision making. In our model, these costs reduce the benefits
of cooperatives and nonprofits which potentially arise from a higher weighting of
consumer surplus in the decision making process.
Costs of collective decision making are common in the organizational eco-
nomics literature, as discussed broadly in Hansmann (1996). In this paper, we
interpret them as costs of the decision making process (see Dow and Putterman,
2000; Dow, 2001, for examples of the costs incurred in worker cooperatives).
These costs usually stem from the need of members to collect information prior
to the decision making, and from the costs of attending meetings. Additionally,
there is a set of costs arising in the decision making process when multiple is-
sues are to be decided and voting cycles might occur (see Zusman, 1992). Costs
of collective decision making usually increase in the heterogeneity of a cooper-
ative’s members (see Hansmann, 1996). Finally, apart from the direct costs of
the decision making process, further costs can arise from influence activities in
organizations (see Milgrom, 1988, for example).
3 The Model
3.1 General Structure
Market setting: Consider a market for a quality product supplied by a single
organization and demanded by a set of consumers. In order to create a level
playing field, all organizational forms face the same technology and production
and sales processes.
Due to minimum efficient scale requirements (fixed set-up costs), no entry
occurs and the quality q ∈ [0, 1] offered is identical for all consumers. At the same
time, there exists an imperfectly substitutable product offered in an alternative
market. This competitive fringe is characterized by the tuple (p0, q0) where p0 is
the price of this good and q0 denotes the quality equivalent of the substitute. We
impose 1 > q0 > p0 ≥ 0 in order to ensure that the substitute good is a relevant
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alternative.12
Players: All players are risk-neutral. Demand for the good stems from a mass
of consumers normalized to unity. While consumers appreciate quality, they differ
in the degree they value it. Let
v(p, q, θ, y) = max{ψ(p, q, θ), 0}+ y (1)
be a consumer’s indirect utility, where y denotes any monetary income and
ψ(p, q, θ) ≡ θq − p is her net consumption utility, which depends on the qual-
ity q ∈ [0, 1] and the price p of the good as well as her personal valuation of
quality, θ. The term θq thus represents a consumer’s willingness to pay for a
good of quality q, which is assumed to be unaffected by potential dividend pay-
ments.13 Individual valuation of quality is private knowledge and distributed
uniformly over [0, 1].
Irrespective of its form, an organization requires a manager who exerts per-
sonal effort to produce quality q. Let e(q) ≥ 0 be the twice continuously differen-
tiable effort cost function of the manager with standard convexity assumptions:
e′(q) ≥ 0 , e′′(q) > 0 and e(q = 0) = 0 (2)
We normalize all other production costs to zero. Apart from a potential wage
income, the manager is able to appropriate a small fraction ε > 0 of revenues
for himself (e.g. via financial tunneling or non-monetary-perks). Hence, he max-
imizes the sum of wage income, diverted revenues and the cost of effort. Finally,
we assume that the manager has an outside option of zero.
We further impose the following two conditions on the manager’s marginal
cost of effort:
e′(q = q0 + p0) <
1− p20
4p20
(3)
e′(q = 1) ≥
3
8
+
p20
8(1− q0)2
(4)
The first assumption ensures that the organization analyzed here provides a qual-
ity superior to the fringe, while the second constraint ensures interior solutions.
12The parameters for the competitive fringe are exogenous and may not be affected directly
by any player, including the social planner. We think of (p0, q0) being influenced by the general
environment and trends such as globalization or technological development.
13Consumers are thus assumed to have quasi-linear preferences with respect to the quality
product and some composite good. Hence, dividends do not affect the purchasing decision of
consumers. Alternatively, one could assume that consumers purchase a large set of goods and
have further sources of income. Any dividend payments in our model would hence be split on
the whole set of goods and can be considered negligible relative to the other income.
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Management is controlled by the organization’s owners. These owners stem
from either of two groups. First, they can be a set of financial investors who
maximize dividend payments. Or, second, they can be a sub-set of the consumers
in the market. Consumer-owners maximize their personal utility.
Finally, there is a benevolent social planner whose only aim is to maximize to-
tal surplus generated in the market. As in Easley and O’Hara (1983) or Hansmann
(1996, p. 23), the focus in our paper is on organizational efficiency, measured in
terms of welfare. For this reason, we introduce the social planner in order to en-
sure that the efficient organizational choice is made ex ante. The central trade-off
of the model prevails as long as the agent in charge of choosing organizational
form positively values both consumer and producer surplus – even with excessive
weight put on either side of the market.
Contracting and decision making: We assume that the owners of an or-
ganization cannot contract on the price level the manager sets or on the profits
of the organization. In order to be able to evaluate prices (or profits), it is not
sufficient to observe the price level per se. Rather, it is necessary to understand
the underlying costs of production because they influence whatever is deemed to
be an appropriate price (or profit) level. To observe the true underlying costs,
however, requires business expertise which only the manager has.
We could assume that product quality is not contractible, either. However,
the special role of consumer-owners makes this assumption less plausible: as
buyers of the good, they directly observe the good’s features and are thus able to
determine its quality. If they are not satisfied with the quality, they could refuse
to prolong the manager’s job contract even without verifiable quality. Thus, as a
model shortcut, we directly assume that the owners may contract on the quality
level to be chosen by the manager.
Given the contractual constraints, owners of an organization have to induce
the manager to provide the desired quality (and thus personal effort). This is done
by an incentive contract specifying quality and a corresponding wage structure
w(q). If owners’ preferences concerning the specifics of the contract (the quality to
be produced) are not perfectly aligned, they have to induce a decision by majority
voting. In this case, the decision making process involves costs of collective
decision making D.14 In order to restrict our attention to positive net profits for
all organizations in equilibrium, we impose the following assumption:15
e(q = 1) ≤ D +
1
4
(
1− q0 + p0
1− q0
)2
(5)
Organizational set-up: Owners’ decisions during the set-up period (in t = 1,
see below) are influenced by expectations on the profits pij(p, q, w) of the organi-
14Under perfect goal alignment, decision making authority can be assigned to any owner.
15Section 6 discusses the implications of potentially negative operational profits.
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zations, where j ∈ {F,N,C}. By assumption (5), we ensure that the organization
does not need to collect fees to finance operations. We also assume that individual
ownership does not cause any disutility for investors nor for those consumers that
expect to be buyers. For example, if consumers have to spend time in order to be
active owners, this assumption implies that active ownership yields compensating
benefits whenever owners anticipate that their time is spent on a product they
will consume in the future.
Finally, we make two assumptions concerning the structure of the dividend
payout in nonprofits and cooperatives. First, members of a nonprofit organi-
zation explicitly waive their rights to any residual income. Rather we assume
that any income is transferred to some charitable organization not modeled ex-
plicitly.16 This is a common legal rule internationally and ensures a binding
non-distribution constraint. Second, we assume the simplest dividend structure
feasible for the cooperative: each member gets an equal share of total operating
profits. However, members have to buy the good for being eligible to receive
dividend payments. This common requirement generally ensures that individuals
do not join the cooperative as members for purely financial reasons (as investors).
3.2 Timing
Organizational set-up:
t = 0 The social planner chooses the organizational form. Investors or expected
buyers join the organization as owners.
t = 1 The owners specify the management contract. This is costless if all owners
agree on the quality level to be specified. Otherwise, costs of D are incurred
to identify the median owner.
Production and consumption period:
t = 2 The manager produces quality q, expands effort e(q), and sets price p.
t = 3 Consumers decide about purchasing the good (or its substitute). All payoffs
(consumption utility, wage payments and dividend payments) are realized
thereafter.
We solve this game by backward-induction to identify a subgame-perfect equilib-
rium.
16The nonprofit’s earnings are thus preserved in the economy and still enter the social plan-
ner’s total surplus calculation.
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4 Organizational Performance
4.1 Model preliminaries
Before analyzing the effects of the three different organizational forms, we de-
rive some preliminary results relevant for all organizational forms. All proofs to
subsequent lemmas and propositions are provided in the appendix.
Managerial price setting: Consider first the decisions of the manager in or-
ganization j once the wage structure w(q) is set. A consumer will purchase the
good as long as ψ(p, q, θ) ≥ max{ψ(p0, q0, θ), 0}. Assuming that organization j
provides higher quality than the competitive fringe, total demand for the good
is 1− θˆ, where θˆ denotes the marginal consumer who is indifferent between pur-
chasing from organization j and the competitive fringe:17
θˆ =
p− p0
q − q0
. (6)
Faced with this demand structure, the manager faces the following optimization
problem:
max
p,q
uM(p, q) + w(q) (7)
where uM(p, q) = εp(1 − θˆ(p, q)) − e(q). As the utility uM is continuous in the
price, we can derive the following optimal pricing rule and corresponding demand:
pj(q) =
q − q0 + p0
2
and θˆj(q) =
1
2
−
p0
2(q − q0)
. (8)
Given quality, the manager thus maximizes revenues (which equal operational
profits) by setting a monopolistic price. The quality choice depends on the wage
structure set by the owners.
Management contract: When writing the management contract conditional
on quality, the owners of the organization take into account the manager’s sub-
sequent optimization problem (7).18 Given that the owners wish to implement a
specific quality level qj, they optimally choose the following wage structure:
w(q) =
{
−uM(pj(qj), qj) if q = qj
−φ if q 6= qj
(9)
where φ is a fine large enough to deter the manager to set his preferred quality
level. As ε is supposed to be small, this fine need not be large. Given his
17The earlier condition (3) ensures that q > q0 will be feasible in equilibrium.
18The ability of the owners to perfectly anticipate the price-setting behavior of the manager
does not affect our subsequent results qualitatively.
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outside option of zero, the wage contract thus compensates the manager for his
personal effort cost in producing quality qj, taking into account his benefits from
appropriated revenues.19 Hence, his final compensation will be wj = e(qj) −
εpj(qj)(1− θˆ(pj, qj)). Combining this result with (8) yields organizational profits
of
pij(qj) = (1− ε)pj(qj)(1− θˆ(pj, qj))− w(qj)− IjD
=
(qj − q0 + p0)
2
4(qj − q0)
− e(qj)− IjD (10)
where Ij = 1 if costs of collective decision making have to be incurred, and Ij = 0
otherwise. Equation (10) shows that revenue appropriation by the manager does
not lower the organizational profits as it is accounted for in the wage structure.
These results hold for any organizational form and create the level playing field
for the subsequent derivation of organizational outcomes.
First-best and second-best solutions: As a last step before analyzing the
organizational forms, we consider the optimal choice by the social planner. In the
first-best setting, the social planner is able to determine quality and allocation
of the product. Optimally, every consumer consumes the high quality product
(marginal costs are zero). The first-best quality level then solves
max
q
∫ 1
0
(θq)dθ − e(q). (11)
which either yields an interior solution with e′(qFB) = 1/2 or results in qFB = 1,
depending on the effort cost function.
More relevant for the subsequent analysis is the second-best solution. In the
second-best setting, the social planner is the owner of the organization which
implies that he may only contract with the manager on the quality to be provided.
Thus, price setting and demand is as specified in (8). Generally, the total surplus
created in the market as a function of qj is defined as the sum of consumer surplus
and profits generated by organization j as well as by the competitive fringe:
TSj ≡
∫ 1
θˆj
(θqj − pj)dθ + pij(qj, ·) +
∫ θˆj
θ
(θq0 − p0)dθ +
∫ θˆj
θ
p0dθ (12)
where θ = p0
q0
defines the marginal consumer who is indifferent between buying
from the outside option and not buying at all. Re-arranging (12) yields
TSj =
3
8
qj − e(qj)− p
2
0
(
1
8(qj − q0)
+
1
2q0
)
+
q0
8
+
p0
4
− IjD. (13)
19An alternative, more practical contract would set the desired quality qj as a minimum level
of quality required. As the manager in equilibrium always prefers to provide lower quality
than required, the results from such a contract would be equivalent to the contract set in
expression (9).
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Maximization of this surplus with respect to qj by the social planner defines the
second-best quality level, qSB:
e′(qSB) =
3
8
+
p20
8(qSB − q0)2
(14)
Condition (4) ensures that qSB < 1. The second-best quality level serves as a
reference level for the subsequent analysis.
4.2 Firms
By definition, shareholders of a firm do not consume the good themselves (see
section 2). Profit maximization is the single objective equally aspired by all
shareholders. Given the expected market outcome as specified in equation (10),
an investor thus aims to maximize his share δF of profits:
max
qF
δF
(
(qF − q0 + p0)
2
4(qF − q0)
− e(qF )− IFD
)
. (15)
Lemma 1 (Quality Provision of the Firm)
(i) The firm offers product quality q∗F ≡
{
q ∈ (q0 + p0; 1]|e
′(q) = 1
4
−
p2
0
4(q−q0)2
}
.
(ii) Goal alignment among shareholders is perfect (IF = 0).
The trade-off investors face is the increase in revenues from higher pricing
versus higher costs of compensating the manager for his effort to produce higher
quality. Firms hence provide goods of superior quality relative to the quality of
the fringe as long as profits are non-negative. At the same time, it is obvious that
a firm never has to bear costs of collective decision making: the pure focus on
financial returns and the resulting goal alignment among shareholders is one of
the key strengths of investor-owned firms, as it has been stressed in the literature
for already some time (see Fama, 1978).
4.3 Nonprofits
Members of a nonprofit organization explicitly waive their rights to any resid-
ual income. Therefore, any member would prefer a product quality maximizing
her indirect utility from the quality-price combination, taking into account the
manager’s decision as characterized in (8):
max
qN
θqN −
qN
2
+
q0 − p0
2
. (16)
The solution to this maximization problem is generally subject to the positive
organizational profits; condition (5) ensures that this restriction is non-binding.
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Lemma 2 (Quality Provision of the Nonprofit)
(i) The nonprofit offers product quality of q∗N ≡ 1.
(ii) There is no goal alignment among members (IN = 1).
The result for the nonprofit in this lemma strongly depends on the non-
distribution constraint. Without any potential dividend payments, owners simply
care about their indirect utility from consuming the good. Hence, for the major-
ity of owners (and thus the median owner) higher quality is always better. As a
consequence, maximum quality q∗N = 1 is chosen. At the same time, owners with
weaker preferences for quality would prefer lower levels of quality production as
they suffer from price increase due to higher quality. Hence, disagreement among
owners requires costly decision-making.
4.4 Cooperatives
In a cooperative, owners potentially get the best of two worlds: they are able to
decide about the quality of the good to be provided (which they value themselves
as consumers) and participate in residual profits. Let δC ≥ 0 be a member’s
profit share. Then a member solves:
max
qC
θqC −
qC
2
+
q0 − p0
2
+ δC
(
(qC − q0 + p0)
2
(qC − q0)4
− e(q)− ICD
)
(17)
A member thus maximizes the sum of her indirect utility from purchase of the
good and her share in the residual income (profits). In equilibrium, every con-
sumer purchasing the cooperative’s good will also become a member of the orga-
nization.
Lemma 3 (Quality Provision of the Cooperative)
(i) The cooperative offers product quality q∗C ≡
{
q ∈ (q0 + p0; 1]|e
′(q) = 3
8
−
3p2
0
8(q−q0)2
}
.
(ii) There is no goal alignment among members (IC = 1).
Members of the cooperative face the trade-off between choosing higher quality
levels, which increases consumption utility at higher costs of inducing manage-
rial effort, or inducing lower quality and thus increasing their dividend payout.
Consequently, neither the maximum quality level of the nonprofit nor the profit-
maximizing level of the firm are optimal for members. Additionally, the trade-off
between consumption utility and dividends depends on individual preferences.
Hence, members of the cooperative incur costs of collective decision making.
Summing up, we find a clear ranking in terms of quality provided in the
market by the three forms of organization.
Proposition 1 (Ranking of Qualities Provided)
Given the definitions in lemmas 1 to 3 and equation (14), we have q∗F < q
∗
C ≤
qSB ≤ q
∗
N .
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Nonprofit members, by waiving their rights to appropriate the residual in-
come, only care about their individual consumer surplus. Consequently, they
demand the maximum level of quality and neglect any inefficiencies arising from
overspending on quality. This explains why nonprofits are often perceived to oper-
ate inefficiently and expensively. Nevertheless, overspending is completely in the
interest of their members, as they exchange income rights for quality. The social
planner, in contrast, trades off the benefits and costs (specifically the manager’s
effort cost) of quality.
On the other side, firms exclusively maximize monetary profits, thus produc-
ing too low a quality. Cooperatives, while being an organizational mix of firms
and nonprofits, provide a level of quality that lies between the level of firms and
the second-best level. The objective function of cooperative members contains
both consumer surplus and producer surplus. Consequently, cooperatives even
achieve the second-best quality level under certain circumstances.20 However, the
presence of the competitive fringe (with q0 > p0 > 0) leads the cooperative to sell
to consumers with low quality preferences (consumers with θ < 1/2). As these
consumers are also members, their preferences affect the quality-provision in the
cooperative, yielding inefficiently low quality.
4.5 Comparing Organizational Forms
The preceding analysis has shown that the three organizational forms provide
different levels of price-quality combinations. However, the quality level alone
does not automatically determine which organization is efficient. To draw con-
clusions about the efficiency of an organization, total surpluses as in (13) have to
be compared. We compare organizations pairwise and characterize the conditions
under which each of them generates a higher total surplus.
Proposition 2 (Organizational Efficiency)
(i) Total surplus under nonprofit organization is higher than under firm organi-
zation (or equal to) if
0 ≤ D ≤ D¯NF ≡
3
8
+
p20
8(q∗N − q0)(q
∗
F − q0)
−
e(q∗N)− e(q
∗
F )
q∗N − q
∗
F
(18)
is satisfied. Otherwise, firms generate higher total surplus.
(ii) Total surplus under cooperative organization is higher than under firm orga-
nization (or equal to) if
0 ≤ D ≤ D¯CF ≡
3
8
+
p20
8(q∗C − q0)(q
∗
F − q0)
−
e(q∗C)− e(q
∗
F )
q∗C − q
∗
F
≥ 0 (19)
20Cooperatives would produce second-best quality for p0 = 0, that is under highest compet-
itive pressure from the competitive fringe.
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is satisfied. Otherwise, firms generate higher total surplus.
(iii) Total surplus under nonprofit organization is higher than under cooperative
organization (or equal to) if
e(q∗N)− e(q
∗
C)
q∗N − q
∗
C
≤
3
8
+
p20
8(q∗N − q0)(q
∗
C − q0)
(20)
is satisfied. Otherwise, cooperatives generate higher total surplus.
Since decision making in cooperatives and nonprofits implies extra costs of
collective decision making, parts (i) and (ii) of proposition 2 depend on D. For
sufficiently high costs of collective decision making, firms are always the preferred
organizational form. In the pairwise comparisons, we find that cooperatives dom-
inate firms as long as the costs of collective decision making are sufficiently low.
This result is intuitive since we have q∗F < q
∗
C ≤ qSB: only large realizations of D
can make cooperatives less efficient than firms. Therefore, if collective decision
making is not very costly – for example because of low heterogeneity of own-
ers – cooperatives combine the best of two worlds by maximizing a combination
of consumer surplus and owners’ profits.
As q∗F < qSB < q
∗
N , it is not so clear whether firms or nonprofits are more
efficient, even if decision making costs in nonprofits are low. In addition to low
D, superiority of nonprofit relative to firm organization requires that the cost
increases from raising quality from firm level (inefficiently low) to nonprofit level
(excessively high) is sufficiently low.
Comparing nonprofit with cooperative organization, cooperatives provide lower
quality but generate higher profits as the compensation of managerial effort is
less costly. Nonprofits, on the other hand, provide higher quality at the expense
of higher effort cost. The LHS of condition (20) measures the additional costs
incurred from increasing the quality level of the cooperative to nonprofit level
relative to the quality change. Intuitively, if the excess quality provision by the
nonprofit is less costly, high quality production by the manager is affordable
and nonprofit organization dominates cooperative organization. If high effort is
instead overly costly, it is more efficient to let the cooperative produce the good.
All three pairwise efficiency comparisons depend on the ratio of cost and
quality differences. An increase (decrease) in convexity of the effort cost function
increases (decreases) this ratio, and hence affects the relative efficiency of the
three organizations. This effect is used in figure 1 which illustrates the efficiency
comparisons of proposition 2. Using a numerical example, we plot the critical
levels of the costs of collective decision making against the convexity of effort
cost.21 For decision making cost levels above the line D¯CF , firms produce higher
total surplus than cooperatives. Similarly, for levels above the line D¯NF , firms
dominate nonprofit organizations. With rising costs D the set of parameters
21For details on the numerical example see appendix A.10.
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Figure 1: Optimal Organizational Forms
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Note: Numerical example with e(q) = x · q2/4, where x measures the convexity of effort cost.
Further details are provided in appendix A.10.
where either cooperatives or nonprofits are preferable shrinks and becomes empty
for sufficiently high levels. For very low cost levels, cooperatives or nonprofits are
efficient, depending on the convexity of effort (with the vertical line giving the
threshold level). The figure also highlights which organization is most efficient in
the six parameter sets defined by the three plotted lines.
Proposition 2 and figure 1 specify the main results of the analysis so far.
The social planner will choose the most efficient organizational form in t = 0,
which depends on specific parameters of the exogenous variables. This strategy
together with lemmas 1 to 3 and managerial pricing as in (8) characterizes the
subgame-perfect equilibrium.
5 Changes in Organizational Efficiency
What happens to relative organizational efficiency if the pressure exerted by the
competitive fringe is increased? Or, alternatively, do we expect organizational
persistence in a changing competitive environment (due to, for example, global-
ization or technological progress)? To approach this issue, we now consider how
our previous results are affected by changes in the competitive fringe.
Note first that in t = 2, the decisions of the organization’s manager determine
the market outcome, described by p∗j , θˆ
∗
j and pi
∗
j in (8) and (10). The comparative
statics of these variables with respect to the price p0 of the substitute good
are intuitive: A decrease in p0 makes the substitute good more attractive, thus
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taking away market share from the organization. Although this is countered by
the manager decreasing the price, the overall effect on market share and profits
remains negative. Formally,
dp∗j
dp0
> 0,
dθˆ∗j
dp0
< 0 and
dpij
dp0
> 0.
A change in the quality equivalent q0 of the substitute good, however, has
slightly different effects: a more attractive substitute good (higher q0) is coun-
tered by a lower price which leads to a higher market share than before for the
organization, formally
dp∗j
dq0
< 0 and
dθˆ∗j
dq0
≤ 0. The latter result appears counter-
intuitive and is due to the increased elasticity of demand. As the substitute good’s
quality rises, not only its attractiveness rises but also the vertical differentiation
between the two markets decreases. Hence, consumers react more sensitively to
price differences. For this reason, the lowering of p∗j actually leads to a higher
level of sales than before. Overall however, profits still decrease: (
dpij
dq0
< 0). As
the effect of changes in q0 are rather specific to our modelling structure, we will
focus on changes in the price level p0 of the competitive fringe in our following
analysis.22
5.1 Changes in Quality
Optimal quality levels q∗j chosen in t = 1 are also affected by changes in the
competitive fringe. We now analyze how the price p0 affects quality, and use a
decrease in this price (tougher competitive environment) for interpretation. This
might be due to process innovations in the market segment producing the closest
substitute which decreases marginal costs and thus lowers the price level.
Lemma 4 (Changes in Quality)
A more competitive substitute good (a decrease in p0) has the following effects:
(i) the quality of the nonprofit remains unaffected,
dq∗N
dp0
= 0;
(ii) the quality of the firm increases,
dq∗F
dp0
≤ 0;
(iii) the quality of the cooperative increases,
dq∗C
dp0
≤ 0.
The intuition for this lemma is rather simple. Owners in firms and coopera-
tives positively value dividends and therefore counter the negative effect of a more
attractive competitive fringe by further differentiating their product quality from
the substitute quality. Hence, competition induces them to increase the quality
on offer (competition effect). For the cooperative, there is an additional member-
ship effect : A tougher competitive environment implies that the cooperative loses
22In the standard models of vertical differentiation, prices and quality levels are strategic
choices of all players. As we disregard strategic interaction between the organization and the
competitive fringe, focussing on changes in the exogenous price p0 (as a proxy for changes in
competitiveness) is appropriate here. For completeness, we report the results for changes in q0
in the appendix as well.
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some buyers and hence members. As this change shifts the preferences of the me-
dian member upwards, there is an additional positive effect on the quality. Since
nonprofits already produce the maximum quality achievable, they can only react
to increased competitive pressure by cutting the price. Accordingly, since qN in
(8) remains constant, nonprofits will lose a comparatively higher market share
than cooperatives or firms. The latter effect may be a reason for the common
perception of nonprofits being inflexible in adjusting to market changes.
Lemma 5 (Relative Changes in Quality)
A more competitive substitute good (a decrease in p0) has the following effects:
(i) firms increase the level of quality by more than nonprofits do,
dq∗N
dp0
−
dq∗F
dp0
≥ 0;
(ii) cooperatives increase the level of quality by more than nonprofits do,
dq∗N
dp0
−
dq∗C
dp0
≥ 0;
(iii) firms increase the level of quality by more than cooperatives do,
dq∗C
dp0
−
dq∗F
dp0
≥ 0,
if and only if
2e′′(q∗C)(q
∗
C − q0)
2 − 3e′′(q∗F )(q
∗
F − q0)
2 ≥ p20
q∗F − q
∗
C − 0.5(q
∗
C − q0)
(q∗C − q0)(q
∗
F − q0)
. (21)
The comparisons of quality changes of the nonprofit with the firm or the coop-
erative are trivial: nonprofits do not alter the quality level in the light of increased
competition from the fringe, but firms and cooperatives do so. Therefore, firms
and cooperatives reduce the quality lead of the nonprofit by increasing their own
quality levels.
The comparison of changes in qualities for cooperative and firm is less ob-
vious. Condition (21) illustrates that the form of the effort cost function plays
an important role. If its curvature and the quality differences between firm and
cooperative are large enough, then the firm will react more strongly to changes
in the competitive environment than the cooperative. If condition (21) is not
satisfied, then the cooperative’s quality lead over the firm increases under a more
competitive environment.
5.2 Changes in Efficiency
We have characterized all preliminary results needed to analyze changes in the
optimality of organizational forms. We now present our central result on the
impact of competition on the efficiency of the three organizational forms.
Proposition 3 (Changes in Organizational Efficiency)
A more competitive substitute good (a decrease in p0) has the following effects:
(i) total surplus under firm organization relative to nonprofit organization in-
creases, d(TSN−TSF )
dp0
≥ 0;
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(ii) total surplus under cooperative organization relative to nonprofit organization
increases, d(TSN−TSC)
dp0
≥ 0;
(iii) total surplus under firm organization relative to cooperative organization in-
creases, d(TSC−TSF )
dp0
≥ 0, if condition (21) in lemma 5 is satisfied.
The total surplus generated by an organizational form directly depends on the
position of its quality level relative to the second-best quality level. As specified
in proposition 1, q∗F < q
∗
C ≤ qSB, while q
∗
N > qSB. Both firms and cooperatives
react to increased outside competition by increasing their quality levels, thus
reducing inefficient underprovision of quality. Nonprofit quality, on the other
side, is not affected by outside competition as nonprofit members only care about
their utility from consumption. This explains why nonprofits lose relative to firms
and cooperatives when competition gets tougher, as emphasized in parts (i) and
(ii) of proposition 3.
Whether firms or cooperatives become more efficient when outside competi-
tion is increased depends on the relative adjustment of their quality levels towards
qSB. If firms adapt to competition more strongly than cooperatives, they also gain
in terms of total surplus under higher competition.23
Figure 2: Changes in Organizational Efficiency
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Note: Numerical example with e(q) = x · q2/4, where x measures the convexity of effort cost.
Further details are provided in appendix A.10.
Figure 2 illustrates the efficiency comparisons of proposition 3. Based on the
numerical example of figure 1, figure 2 shows how the set of parameters where
23In numerical simulations of the model, the increase in total surplus under firm organization
always exceeded the increase under cooperative organization for various effort cost functions
(see appendix A.10).
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either of the organizational forms is optimal changes under competition.24 The
dashed lines replicate the static efficiency comparison of figure 1. The solid lines
show the new optimal organizational choice if outside competition has increased.
In the case illustrated in the figure, firms become more efficient relative to both
nonprofits and cooperatives. Similarly, nonprofits lose against both firms and
cooperatives, while cooperatives lose against firms but gain relative to nonprofits.
Overall, our results provide empirical predictions about observed organiza-
tional forms in different market environments. Differences in the degree of com-
petition across markets translate into different organizational structures, with
firms more prevalent in more competitive markets. Moreover, our results can
also be used to explain changes in organizational forms over time. As markets
become more competitive, we would predict an increase in the provision of goods
by firms, rather than nonprofits or cooperatives. Such changes in organizational
form might be induced by organizations actually being converted into new forms
(as witnessed in the financial sector, see the initial credit card and stock ex-
change examples). Alternatively, these changes might be more gradual, driven
by the demise of old, less efficient organizations and the creation and entry of
new organizations.25
6 Discussion and Extensions
Operational losses, organizational existence, and membership fees: We
assumed throughout the previous analysis that profits of all organizations are non-
negative (see (5)). We will now argue that the results of our model are robust
even if the revenues of an organization are too low to finance its operations. In
order to do so, we introduce fixed costs M of operations which any organization
incurs. We then look at the effect of an increase in these costs on our results in
terms of relative efficiency of the organizations.
For firms, an increase in fixed costs such that profits turn negative has straight-
forward effects: firms with negative profits will be closed down by its owners as
investors solely care about financial returns. As long as a firm can exist, it will
provide the quality level q∗F described in lemma 1.
Nonprofits are the organizational form whose owners, by definition, care least
about profits. If a nonprofit’s existence is threatened, the social planner may start
to levy a fee in order to finance operations. However, the ability of the social
planner to collect membership fees from any organization’s owners is restricted
by private knowledge of individual preferences for quality, θ. Nevertheless, the
literature on mechanism design has shown that one can induce agents to reveal
24See appendix A.10 for more details on the numerical example.
25We are very grateful to a reviewer for pointing out this aspect of organizational change via
the creation of new entities.
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their privately observable preferences.26 Assuming that the social planner is able
to collect a fee from any consumer with preferences for quality above some thresh-
old level, levying such a fee would affect the set of owners by driving the marginal
owner θ˜N upwards. Although this does not affect the equilibrium quality level of
q∗N = 1, it may improve organizational efficiency by establishing goal alignment
among members: if the marginal member has θ ≥ 1/2, there is no more dis-
agreement among members about the quality. Consequently, costs of collective
decision making are not incurred anymore.
The case of cooperatives is more complex. When profits turn negative, the
social planner may levy a fee, similarly to the case of the nonprofit. The marginal
owner θ˜C would move upwards, as would the median owner. Initially, the equi-
librium quality level q∗C would hence increase, and so would the price p
∗
C and the
marginal buyer θˆC . Thus, apart from a fee income effect, levying this fee would
entail a membership effect and a revenue effect, the aggregate effect of which on a
cooperative’s income does not have a clear-cut sign.27 Despite increased quality,
the relative position of q∗C , however, would not change as the upper bound on
q∗C is still qSB (proposition 1 remains valid). Note, nevertheless, that a tighter
budget can, under certain circumstances, increase the efficiency of a cooperative.
Generally, if losses in any organizational form are sufficiently high, it will not
be able to exist. The de facto efficient form can thus differ from the theoretically
efficient form characterized in proposition 2. Alternatively, if an organizational
form is found to be efficient for specific parameter realizations but incurs negative
profits, the social planner (as a government) may decide to finance it via lump-
sum transfers. This can be interpreted as creating a kind of public organization,
a topic that is of high importance in itself (not least because of the interaction
between the public financier and the formal, private owners) but not the focus of
our analysis.28
Managerial altruism: In the analysis, the manager only incurred costs from
producing higher quality. However, one can argue that often employees and man-
agement derive some benefits from higher quality production as well (see Glaeser
and Shleifer, 2001, for example). Assume that a manager derives a personal
benefit b(q) ≥ 0 from producing quality q, where 0 ≤ b′(q) ≤ e′(q). Given a
zero outside option wage and a quality level q, the wage of a manager can thus
26See Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), chapter 7. In contrast to the literature on the private
provision of public goods (Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian, 1986; Bilodeau and Slivinski, 1997),
consumers have zero marginal effect on the good’s provision in our framework.
27The relation between the marginal owner and quality is actually non-monotonic. Once
the marginal owner surpasses θ = 1/2, quality and price actually decrease in θ˜C . Hence, from
an efficiency perspective, the membership effect (increasing θ˜C) can both reduce inefficient
inclusion (if θ˜C < 1/2) or create inefficient exclusion (if θ˜C ≥ 1/2).
28Refer to Hart et al. (1997), Besley and Ghatak (2001) or DeWenter and Malatesta (2001)
for related literature.
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be reduced by the size of the personal benefit. Hence, cooperatives and firms
would provide higher qualities, and nonprofits would be able to provide maxi-
mum quality at lower costs. Qualitatively, however, altruism does not change our
results.29
7 Conclusion
This paper highlights some key differences between firms, nonprofits, and cooper-
atives, where each of these organizations is governed by economic principles and
rational decision making. The different organizational structures and members’
objective functions lead to different costs of ownership and thus affect organiza-
tional efficiency. The final efficiency trade-off then depends on the competitive
environment, the decision making process and technology.
In the static efficiency comparison, firms are the optimal organizational form
when costs of collective decision making are sufficiently high – despite the fact
that they provide an inefficiently low quality level. In other words, firms are a
low-cost means to produce quality as they offer the benefits of a straightforward
organizational form where goal alignment is easily ensured. In contrast, both
nonprofits and cooperatives suffer from disagreement among members and thus
from costly decision making.
Quite opposite to firms, nonprofits serve as a means to commit to the pro-
duction of high quality due to the lack of alternative usage of an organization’s
profits. As the quality level produced under nonprofit organization is inefficiently
high, it only dominates the cooperative forms as long as the costs of raising quality
(by inducing additional managerial effort) is low.
Lastly, members of a cooperative are concerned with both operational profits
as well as (their own) consumer surplus. In an environment with imperfectly
competitive markets, the overall objective function in a cooperative most closely
resembles the objective function of a social planner. The drawback of this more
complex objective function lies in the costs of collective decision making if the set
of owners is heterogenous. Choice of the cooperative form thus requires low costs
of decision making, for example due to a sufficiently low number of members who
can coordinate easily or due to a sufficiently homogeneous membership base.
Apart from the static efficiency trade-off, this paper also considers how changes
in the market environment affect the efficiency of the three organizational forms.
Increases in competition have a disciplining effect on both firms and cooperatives:
in order to compensate for lower demand, both organizational forms adjust the
29This result relates to the literature on objectives of owners and managers in nonprofits. Note
that our focus is on the level playing field among organizational forms, so we explicitly exclude
potential self-selection effects of managers of different types to different organizational forms
(see e.g. Besley and Ghatak, 2005). Francois (2003) provides another approach by recruiting
managers from the set of consumers.
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quality offered upwards. This implies that both organizations will be preferable
to the nonprofit form more often. While the net effect on organizational efficiency
may be ambiguous when cooperatives and firms are compared, our results sug-
gest that, for standard technologies, firms will react more strongly to competitive
pressure.
Although our model’s results still await rigorous empirical testing, anecdotal
evidence from studies of demutualization and from the statements made in the
wake of the NYSE, Mastercard and Visa announcements suggests that compe-
tition plays an important role in organizational changes. Moreover, analyses of
financial exchanges’ conversion additionally highlight the role of internal decision
making processes:
But, as markets became more sophisticated, the interests of various
member groups began to diverge, causing tremendous strain in the
governance and decision-making process of financial exchanges. (Ag-
garwal and Dahiya, 2006, p. 99)
In the terminology of our model, tougher competition and higher costs of col-
lective decision making are a key feature of exchanges’ environment today. The
observed reaction by many exchanges, conversion to investor-owned firms, accord
well with our model’s predictions.
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A Appendix
A.1 Organizational Forms
Firm Cooperative Nonprofit
Residual Rights
of Control
Shareholders Members Members
(Donors)
Claim on
Residual In-
come
Shareholders (Consuming)
Members
Donated to Char-
ity
Financing Revenues Revenues +
Membership Fees
Revenues +
Membership Fees
Membership
Calculus
Dividend Dividend + Con-
sumer Surplus
Consumer Sur-
plus
Table 1: Major organizational differences
A.2 Proof of Lemma 1
(i): The assumptions on the effort cost function in (2) and (4) ensure existence
of an interior solution strictly between zero and one. The first-order condition to
(15) is then
1
4
−
p20
4(qF − q0)2
− e′(qF ) = 0 (22)
which defines q∗F . The requirement q
∗
F > q0 + p0 is fulfilled whenever
e′(q0 + p0) <
1
4
−
p20
4(q∗F − q0)
2
≥ 0 (23)
is satisfied. Second-order conditions additionally require
SOCF ≡
p20
2(q∗F − q0)
3
− e′′(q∗F ) < 0. (24)
(ii) follows from the absence of θ in the first-order condition. Q.E.D.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 2
(i): The first-order derivative of a consumer/owner’s objective function is θ − 1
2
.
This is strictly positive for θ > 1
2
and strictly negative for θ < 1
2
. Hence, there
are conflicting interests, such that a decision by majority voting is required. Let
θ˜N denote the marginal member of the nonprofit such θ ∈ [θ˜, 1] for all members.
27
Even under maximum ownership (marginal member equals marginal consumer,
θ˜N = θˆN > 0), the median owner’s preference parameter θ is always above
1
2
.
Hence, maximum quality q∗N = 1 is always chosen.
(ii): While the quality q∗N offered is unaffected by the position of the marginal
member, θ˜N <
1
2
implies that costs of collective decision making D have to be
incurred. Q.E.D.
A.4 Proof of Lemma 3
(i): From (17) the first-order condition for a member translates into
e′(qC) =
1
4
−
p20
4(qC − q0)2
+ (θ −
1
2
)
1
δC
. (25)
Hence, the individually optimal quality levels differ for different θ; it is impossible
to find two members with distinct preferences θ who would prefer the same level
of quality. Consequently, collective decision making by a majority vote leads to
the outcome preferred by the median member.
In order to determine the median member, let θ˜C denote the marginal member
of the cooperative such that every consumer with θ ≥ θ˜C joins the cooperative
as a member. As a result, a member’s profit share is δC =
1
1−θ˜C
, while the me-
dian member’s preference parameter is 1+θ˜C
2
. Substituting the median member’s
preference parameter and the profit share in (25) gives
e′(qC) =
1
4
−
p20
4(qC − q0)2
+
θ˜C(1− θ˜C)
2
. (26)
Next, we use the fact that every consumer who is eligible to join the cooper-
ative will do so as, due to our assumption in (5), he expects a positive dividend.
Therefore, since membership depends on consumption of the good, the marginal
member of a cooperative will also be its marginal consumer, formally
θ˜C = θˆ
∗
C =
1
2
−
p0
2(qC − q0)
(27)
where the last part follows from (8). Inserting (27) into (26) results in q∗C as
defined in the proposition.
Finally, second-order conditions require
SOCC ≡
1
1− θ˜C
(
p20
2(q∗C − q0)
3
− e′′(q∗C)
)
< 0 (28)
to hold, again with θ˜C = θˆ
∗
C .
(ii) follows from the individually optimal quality as specified in (25). Q.E.D.
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A.5 Proof of Proposition 1
The results are based on the convexity assumption in (2): q∗C > q
∗
F follows from
q0 + p0 < qj and hence
p0
qj−q0
< 1 for j ∈ {F,C,N}; q∗N ≥ qSB by assumption (4);
qSB > q
∗
C for p0 > 0 and qSB = q
∗
C for p0 = 0. Q.E.D.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 2
Generally, the difference in total surplus between two organizations j, k ∈ {F,N,C},
k 6= j is
TSj − TSk =
3
8
(q∗j − q
∗
k)− (e(q
∗
j )− e(q
∗
k))
+
p20(q
∗
j − q
∗
k)
8(q∗j − q0)(q
∗
k − q0)
−D(Ij − Ik) (29)
(i): The difference between total surplus under nonprofit and under firm organi-
zation is TSN−TSF =
3
8
(q∗N−q
∗
F )− (e(q
∗
N)−e(q
∗
F ))+
p2
0
(q∗N−q
∗
F )
8(q∗
N
−q0)(q∗F−q0)
−D. Solving
TSN − TSF ≥ 0 for D yields condition (18) for superiority of the nonprofit orga-
nization.
(ii): The same is true analogously for TSC −TSF , which provides condition (19)
for cooperatives to provide total surplus at least as high as firms. To see that
D¯CF ≥ 0, note that, by the general definition of convexity, the maximum value of
e(q∗C)−e(q
∗
F )
q∗
C
−q∗
F
is e′(q∗C) =
3
8
−
3p2
0
8(q∗
C
−q0)2
(see lemma 3). Inserting this into the definition
of D¯CF provides
D¯CF ≥
p20
8(q∗C − q0)(q
∗
F − q0)
+
3p20
8(q∗C − q0)
2
≥ 0 (30)
Hence, for p0 > 0 and D sufficiently low, cooperatives are always more efficient
than firms.
(iii): TSN −TSC ≥ 0 provides condition (20) for cooperatives to generate higher
total surplus than nonprofits. Q.E.D.
A.7 Proof of Lemma 4
(i): q∗N is independent of any parameter changes as long as its level, q
∗
N = 1, can
be financed by operational profits. This is satisfied by assumption (5).
(ii): Total differentiation of the first-order condition (FOC) of the firm (22) and
use of the second-order condition, SOCF < 0, yields
dq∗F
dp0
=
p0
2(q∗F − q0)
2(SOCF )
≤ 0. (31)
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(iii): Total differentiation of the FOC of the cooperative (26) yields
dq∗C
dp0
=
1
(1− θ˜C)SOCC
[
p0
2(q∗C − q0)
2
−
1− 2θ˜C
2
dθ˜C
dp0
]
≤ 0 (32)
To see the sign of
dq∗C
dp0
, note that: SOCC < 0 due to the second-order condition in
lemma 3; θ˜C = θˆC , which implies θ˜C ≤ 1/2 as well as
dθ˜C
dp0
= dθˆC
dp0
= − 1
2(q∗
C
−q0)
< 0
by (8). Q.E.D.
Remark: Total differentiation of the FOC of the firm (22) with respect to the
quality equivalent q0 of the substitute good yields
dq∗F
dq0
=
p20
2(qF − q0)3(SOCF )
≤ 0 . (33)
For the cooperative, the comparative static is
dq∗C
dq0
=
1
(1− θ˜C)SOCC
[
p20
2(qC − q0)3
−
1− 2θ˜C
2
dθ˜C
dq0
]
≤ 0 (34)
where the sign follows from SOCC < 0 and
dθ˜C
dq0
= dθˆC
dq0
= − p0
2(q∗
C
−q0)2
≤ 0. The
quality level of the nonprofit remains unaffected by q0.
A.8 Proof of Lemma 5
(i) and (ii) follow directly from lemma 4.
(iii): Using SOCF , SOCC , θ˜C = θˆC and
dθ˜C
dp0
= − 1
2(q∗
C
−q0)
yields
dq∗C
dp0
−
dq∗F
dp0
=
1.5p0(q
∗
C − q0)
p20 − 2e
′′(q∗C)(q
∗
C − q0)
3
−
p0(q
∗
F − q0)
p20 − 2e
′′(q∗F )(q
∗
F − q0)
3
(35)
The sign of this difference depends on the specific model parameters (both nu-
merators are positive, with the first being larger, both denominators are negative,
with the second being closer to zero). Generally, (35) is (weakly) positive iff
2e′′(q∗C)(q
∗
C − q0)
2 − 3e′′(q∗F )(q
∗
F − q0)
2 ≥ −p20
q∗C − q
∗
F + 0.5(q
∗
C − q0)
(q∗C − q0)(q
∗
F − q0)
(36)
The RHS of (36) is always negative because of Proposition 1. The sign of the
LHS however depends on the shape of the effort cost function. Q.E.D.
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A.9 Proof of Proposition 3
Generally, the derivative of difference in total surplus (see (29) with respect to p0
is
d(TSj − TSk)
dp0
=
(
3
8
− e′(q∗j )
)
dq∗j
dp0
−
(
3
8
− e′(q∗k)
)
dq∗k
dp0
+
p0(q
∗
j − q
∗
k)
4(q∗j − q0)(q
∗
k − q0)
(37)
+
p20
8(q∗j − q0)(q
∗
k − q0)
(
q∗k − q0
q∗j − q0
dq∗j
dp0
−
q∗j − q0
q∗k − q0
dq∗k
dp0
)
(i): For the difference TSN −TSF , note that q
∗
N > q
∗
F > q0,
dq∗N
dp0
= 0,
dq∗F
dp0
≤ 0 and
e′(q∗F ) ≤
1
4
(see firm’s FOC (22)). Hence, by (37),
d(TSN − TSF )
dp0
≥ 0. (38)
(ii): For the difference TSN − TSC , note that q
∗
N > q
∗
C > q0,
dq∗N
dp0
= 0,
dq∗C
dp0
≤ 0
and e′(q∗C) ≤
3
8
(see the cooperative’s FOC (26) where θ˜C ≤ 1/2). Hence, by (37),
d(TSN − TSC)
dp0
≥ 0. (39)
(iii): For the difference TSC − TSF , inserting e
′(q∗F ) and e
′(q∗C) from the firm’s
and cooperative’s FOC into (37) yields, after rearranging,
d(TSC − TSF )
dp0
=
(
1
8
+
3p20
8(q∗F − q0)
2
)(
dq∗C
dp0
−
dq∗F
dp0
)
+
p0(q
∗
C − q
∗
F )
4(q∗F − q0)(q
∗
C − q0)
−
(
θ˜C(1− θ˜C)
2
+
(q∗C − q0)
2 − (q∗F − q0)
2
(q∗F − q0)
2(q∗C − q0)
2
)
dq∗C
dp0
(40)
Apart from the first term, all expressions in (40) are weakly positive. Hence, for
the whole expression to be (weakly) positive,
dq∗C
dp0
−
dq∗F
dp0
≥ 0 is a sufficient condition.
Lemma 5.(iii) provides the conditions for the latter inequality to hold. Q.E.D.
Remark: Generally, the derivative of excess surplus with respect to q0 yields
d(TSj − TSk)
dq0
=
(
3
8
− e′(q∗j )
)
dq∗j
dq0
−
(
3
8
− e′(q∗k)
)
dq∗k
dq0
+
p20
8(q∗j − q0)(q
∗
k − q0)
(
q∗j − q
∗
k
q∗k − q0
+
q∗j − q
∗
k
q∗j − q0
(41)
+
q∗k − q0
q∗j − q0
dq∗j
dq0
−
q∗j − q0
q∗k − q0
dq∗k
dq0
)
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For the difference TSN − TSF , this implies
d(TSN − TSF )
dq0
≥ 0 (42)
as
dq∗N
dq0
= 0,
dq∗F
dq0
≤ 0 and e′(q∗F ) ≤
1
4
.
For the difference TSN − TSC , this implies
d(TSN − TSC)
dq0
≥ 0 (43)
as
dq∗N
dq0
= 0,
dq∗C
dq0
≤ 0 and e′(q∗C) ≤
3
8
.
For the difference TSC − TSF , the sign of the derivative with respect to q0 is
generally indeterminate.
A.10 Numerical Example
To illustrate the efficiency comparisons and the effects of costs of collective deci-
sion making and the curvature of the effort cost function graphically, we computed
the following example:
e(q) =
x
4
q2
where x ∈ [0.753; 0.78] to meet the restrictions imposed by our model. We
additionally assumed q0 = 0.1 and p0 = 0.095 (figure 1) or a decrease in p0
from 0.095 to 0.09 (figure 2). Quality levels chosen and total surplus are then
calculated explicitly for each organization. Figures 1 and 2 then plot levels of
D ∈ [0.0232; 0.0242] along the ordinate against the convexity measure.
Remark: The results from the numerical calculations do not depend on the spe-
cific form assumed above: Similar numerical computations were undertaken for
e(q) = e
qx
−1
25
and e(q) = 1
4
q1+x as specific functional forms. For valid parameter
ranges and different values of x, the same patterns emerge as those depicted in
figures 1 and 2.
32
